Spoilt for choice

Recently Colin Rogers documented Liverpool's use of substitutes in First Division matches from 1965/66 to 1986/87. Here he continues his interesting analysis for 1987/88 to 2007/08. Note: Both articles are about league matches only, in order to facilitate comparisons between seasons and between managers.

From 1987/88 to 1996/97, English clubs were allowed to have two players (three including a goalkeeper from 1992/93) on the bench, but only two could be brought on in a match. There were differences in the outfield choices made by three managers in charge during those years, their annual averages being:

In their choice of substitutes, Dalglish seems to have been more flexible than Souness, spreading his selections more widely. Where the former included midfielders in sixty-five per cent of his games in charge, his successor used them in ninety percent; where Dalglish was prepared to put two defenders on the bench, Souness did so only once (Nick Tanner and Rob Jones against Middlesbrough on 7 November 1992). Dalglish was twice as likely as Souness to have a defender and a striker on the bench.

For the remainder of 1993/94 and the whole of 1994/95, following the departure of Souness, Roy Evans placed the same emphasis as his immediate predecessor, always having at least one midfielder ready on the bench (except once when Nicol and Bjornebye appeared against MUFC on 4 January 1994). The figures for 1995/96, the last season before five subs could be nominated instead of three, was distorted by the towering presence of Ian Rush in his final season. So far, Evans had used even fewer strikers than Souness, but now Rush was on the bench 18 times. In the legend’s last match for LFC at Anfield, they appear to have broken the rules by having Rush and two midfielders as subs, when one of the three should have been a goalkeeper. (He describes his emotional farewell in his autobiography, pp. 373-5. See also the match reports at lfchistory.net.)

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In seasons 1996/97 to 2007/08, clubs were allowed to have five substitutes named for each match, on condition that at least one was a goalkeeper, and that a maximum of three players could be brought on. LFC managers during those eleven years were the last two seasons of Roy Evans on his own, all six of Gérard Houllier, and four under Rafa Benitez. An analysis of how each used the newly liberalised subs rule suggests a few differences in approach to Premiership football.

Goalkeepers are easily described. For example, Warner was the unused sub in the whole of 1996/97. He shared the following season with Friedel, Nielsen (and James before he took Grobbelaar‘s place as No. 1.) Arphexad was the normal sub, with Nielsen occasionally in his place and Kirkland as James’s sub for most of 2001/02. Dudek replaced Kirkland as first choice substitute in the next season, and by 2003/04, Houllier was using no fewer than all five goalies in the squad for league matches. Benitez used the same number in his first season, but there was a steady change of preferred keepers as new faces came into the squad. Itandje and Martin shared 2007/08, the last season examined.

In contrast to outfield players, bringing on a sub goalkeeper during a match was a rarity. The first of only three in these eleven years was Arphexad on 9 Feb 2002 when Dudek had to go off with a groin strain. Luzi stood in for Dudek on 7 Jan 2004 for the same reason; and Dudek himself came on to replace Luis Garcia at Stamford Bridge, 5 Feb 2006, but Garcia was being sacrificed after Reina had been sent off.

Leaving aside the one named goalkeeper, by far the most popular choice by all three managers was to have one defender, two midfielders, and one striker to make up the four others. However, each manager was prepared to make quite unusual choices which could diverge considerably from the norm. In 1997/98, there were three Premiership games under Evans which omitted any defender, two with no midfielder, and seven with no striker. The season in which Evans and Houllier had that strange partnership (and in 2004/05), one third of league matches were played without a striker on the bench. In 2002/03, Houllier played fourteen games with no strikers as subs, and the following season sixteen had no defenders. Benitez partially restored the earlier equilibrium, by 2006/07 never playing a match without a striker at the ready, and only one where there was no defender or midfielder. Thereafter the rules changed again, and seven subs could be nominated.

Mark Kennedy was no stranger to the bench.

The 1996/97 rule change allowed a manager, if he so chose, to have up to four outfield players from the same part of the pitch (defender, midfielder, striker), but only Houllier chose all four, three times in 2001/02 (20 October 2001 v. Leicester; 16 March 2002 v. Middlesbrough; and 13 Apr 2002 v Sunderland).

At first, Roy Evans was too cautious even to nominate three from the same category, let alone four; but he made such a decision six times in the following season, always with midfielders. Houllier chose to put three defenders on the bench (4 October 1998 v. Chelsea; 16 May 1999; and 13 Feb 2000 v. Arsenal). He was by far the most likely to use ‘three of a kind’, putting on three midfielders and Heskey in the last ten league games of 2002/03. Caution (or good sense?) returned with Benitez, who seems to have been very reluctant to have even three (only twice in his first four seasons (2005/06 and 2005/07) for example).

The days of long-suffering players consigned to the subs’ bench for many league games in a row had not disappeared, and very few can have been Origi-like, outwardly happy to be one of those who served while waiting. Roy Evans kept Nigel Clough on the bench for thirteen consecutive league games (twice on), and Ian Rush sixteen (nine on as sub)! Neil Ruddock kept the seat warm eleven times during 1996/97, brought on only twice. So did World Cup winner Karl-Heinz Riedle two seasons later, but at least he got a game in every one. Houllier also inflicted long spells on Staunton (11) and Le Tallec (13) but Benitez seems to have been reluctant to make any player do so more than five times.

Badge of honour must go to Mark Kennedy who, in 1996/97, was benched for twenty-two league games in a row, and called on by Roy Evans in only four of them. They also serve who only sit and wait.

Rushie was on the bench for sixteen consecutive league matches in his final season

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We can all remember times when we have gone one goal up, regarded as fragile by the faithful watching or listening to the events unfolding. How would the manager react? Did he have faith in the team (which had, after all, just given us the lead) to fight off the inevitable onslaught from the opposition which was facing the loss of all three points? Would he bolster the defence and stick rather than twist? Or would he judge that another goal would be a killer blow for LFC and make an aggressive change which would facilitate that outcome?

To investigate the question raised at the end of Part 1 - whether and how managers used substitutes when reacting to going one goal up towards the end of a match – we first need to define ‘towards the end of a match’, and identify those occasions when it happened. For the purpose of this article, I’ve taken an arbitrary ‘about 20 minutes to go’, a bit later than the average time when managers appear to have sent on substitutes whatever the score. We should then eliminate those occasions before 1996/97 when they had already limited their choice by having two defenders, two midfielders, or two strikers on the bench, a total of 133 in the ten years when only two outfield subs were allowed. We have to discount the times when a sub is brought on to replace an injured player. We also have to ignore the majority of such games because, when it came to the decision, managers tended to keep the existing team on the field.

One more caveat, if I may. Replacing a ‘normal’ full back with Trent Alexander-Arnold (or vice-versa, as on 12 September 2020) would be a like-for-like switch – but only on paper!

Under Evans, Houllier and the first four years of Benitez, what’s left are all too few matches (31) to be able to make a definitive judgement about an individual manager’s policy or instinct. Among the thirty-one, however, a trend is unmistakable. In twelve cases, the manager exchanged like for like. In eighteen of the thirty-one, the emphasis was on defence, with six midfielders replaced by six defenders, and twelve strikers replaced by either a defender (2) or midfielder (10). Only in one case can I find a manager using a more attacking sub in order to increase the one goal lead, Luis Garcia replacing John Arne Riise who had just scored against Manchester City, 26 November 2005.

A comparative look at the decisions made by Jurgen Klopp for 2015 to the end of the 20/21 season gives very similar results, the main emphasis being on defending an existing, though fragile, lead, with 17 substitutions, rather than trying to extend it by replacing a defender or midfielder with a striker – with only three examples found.

Written by Colin Rogers for LFChistory.net